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Global climate change poses great risks to poor people whose livelihoods depend directly on the use of 
natural resources. Mitigation of the adverse effects of climate change is a high priority on the 
international agenda. Carbon trading, under the Kyoto Protocol as well as outside the protocol, is growing 
rapidly from a small base and is expected to increase dramatically under present trends. However, 
developing countries, in particular Sub-Saharan Africa, remain marginalized in global carbon markets, 
with Africa’s market share constituting less than 1 percent (excluding South Africa and North African 
countries). The potential for mitigation through agriculture in the African region is estimated at 17 percent 
of the global total, and the economic potential (i.e. considering carbon prices) is estimated at 10 percent of 
the total global mitigation potential. Similarly, Africa’s forestry potential per year is 14 percent of the 
global total, and the avoided-deforestation potential accounts for 29 percent of the global total. 
Appropriate climate-change policies are needed to unleash this huge potential for pro-poor mitigation 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such policies should focus on increasing the profitability of 
environmentally sustainable practices that generate income for small producers and create investment 
flows for rural communities. Pro-poor investments, community development, new research, and capacity 
building can all help integrate the agriculture, forestry, and land-use systems of developing countries into 
the carbon trading system, both generating income gains and advancing environmental security. 
Achieving this result will require effective integration, from the global governance of carbon trading to 
the sectoral and micro-level design of markets and contracts, as well as investment in community 
management. Streamlining the measurement and enforcement of offsets, financial flows, and carbon 
credits for investors is also needed. This review paper begins with an overview of global carbon markets, 
including opportunities for carbon trading, and the current involvement of developing countries, with a 
focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by an assessment of the mitigation potential and options 
involving agriculture, land use, and forestry. The major constraints to the participation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa in global carbon markets are discussed, and options for integrating the region into global carbon 
markets are proposed. 
Keywords: climate change, mitigation, carbon markets, Clean Development Mechanism, Sub-
Saharan Africa  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
adopted in December 1997 by several industrialized countries and some economies in transition, and the 
agreement came into force in February 2005. Parties to the agreement have taken on legally binding 
reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are responsible for global warming. The protocol 
allows for a flexible “cap and trade” system that imposes national limits on emissions but also allows 
countries to engage in emission trading if they desire to maintain or increase their emissions of GHGs.  
Within the short period of its existence, global carbon trading has rapidly expanded in volume, 
value, and scope. The volume of carbon transactions has expanded from 717 MtCO2e
1 in 2005 to 2,983 
MtCO2e in 2007, and the total value of these transactions has increased from US$11 billion to US$64 
billion (Table 1). The value of transactions within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which involves carbon trading with developing countries, has more than doubled each 
year between 2005 and 2007. Moreover, outside the Kyoto Protocol, several initiatives to manage GHG 
emissions are emerging. For instance, in the United States, seven northeastern states signed a 
memorandum of understanding to reduce emissions in December 2005 (11 American states are now 
involved in this initiative; see http://www.rggi.org), and California passed a new law to reduce GHG 
emissions in September 2006. Following a shift in the composition of Congress, the U.S. federal 
government is widely expected to adopt stronger measures to reduce GHG emissions in 2009. All these 
events indicate rapid increases in future global carbon trading even beyond 2012, which defines the end 
of the first emission budget period.  
Despite this expansion, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) accounts for only 1.4 percent of all registered 
CDM projects—only 17 out of 1,186 projects (CDM 2008). SSA’s share of CDM projects is nine times 
smaller than its global share of GHG emissions, including emissions from land use and land-use change, 
and most of these projects (14 out of 17) are located in just one country, South Africa (CDM 2008; de 
Gouvello et al. 2008). Given that SSA’s share of projects is smaller than its share of emissions, there is 
potential for greater inclusion in global carbon markets. These include afforestation/reforestation of 
degraded lands, cropland management, waste management using composting or landfill gas capture, 
hydropower, and energy-efficiency projects.  
The potential for mitigation through agriculture in the African region has been estimated at 970 
MtCO2e per year by 2030, 17 percent of the global total; and the economic potential, which allows for 
carbon trading, is estimated to be 265 MtCO2e, 10 percent of the total global mitigation potential 
(assuming carbon prices of up to US$20 per tCO2e) (Smith et al. 2008). Similarly, for forestry, Africa’s 
potential of 1,925 MtCO2e per year is 14 percent of the global total (Nabuurs et al. 2007). Even more 
importantly, Africa’s avoided-deforestation potential of 1,160 MtCO2e per year accounts for 29 percent of 
the global total (ibid.). Why is this potential underutilized? What are the constraints preventing SSA from 
effectively participating in global carbon markets? This paper will address these issues in turn.  
                                                      




Table 1. Carbon markets, volumes, and values 
      2005  2006  2007 













Allowances                   
  
EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme   324  8,204  1,104 24,436 2,061 50,097 
  
New South Wales 
Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Scheme  6  59  20 225 25 224 
   Chicago Climate Exchange  1  3  10  38  23  72 
  
UK Emissions Trading 
System  0  1  NA  NA       
   Subtotal  332  8,268  1,134 24,699 2,109 50,394 
Project-based transactions                   
  
Clean Development 
Mechanism  359 2,651 562 6,249 791  12,877 
    Joint  Implementation  21 101 16 141 41 499 
  
Other compliance and 
voluntary transactions  5  37  33 146 42 265 
    Subtotal  384 2,789 611 6,536 874  13,641 
TOTAL  717  11,057 1,745 31,235 2,983 64,035 
Source: Capoor and Ambrosi 2007, 2008 
Note: MtCO2e = mega tons of carbon dioxide or equivalent 
MUS$ = million U.S. dollars 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general description of how the various 
carbon markets function and an overview of global climate-change agreements, discusses their 
significance in terms of volumes traded, and addresses the participation of countries. The main types of 
assets traded through the CDM and Africa’s market share are discussed in Section 3, and Section 4 
describes emission statuses and trends by region and sector. Mitigation potential and options relating to 
agriculture, land use, and forestry are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 outlines the major constraints to 
the region’s participation in global carbon markets. Options for integrating SSA into global carbon 





2.  AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS AND CARBON 
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS
2 
It is now widely accepted that the atmospheric concentration of GHGs has been increasing rapidly as a 
result of human activities such as fossil fuel burning and deforestation, leading to global climate change. 
It is also widely accepted that global climate change would have adverse impacts on the socioeconomic 
development of many nations (Stern 2007).  
The UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, at what was informally known as the Earth 
Summit, in an effort to reduce countries’ emission footprints and curb the dangers of global climate 
change. This convention was the first international environmental treaty produced at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Signatories to the UNFCCC are split into two 
groups: Annex I countries
3 (industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition) and non–
Annex I countries (mainly developing countries). Annex I countries and some transitional economies 
agree to reduce their emissions (particularly carbon dioxide [CO2]) to target levels below their 1990 
emission levels. If these countries cannot do so, they must buy emission credits or invest in conservation. 
Developing countries have no immediate restrictions under the UNFCCC but may volunteer to join the 
group of Annex I countries when they are sufficiently developed.  
The treaty aimed at reducing emissions of GHGs in order to combat global warming. As 
originally framed, it set no mandatory limits on GHG emissions for individual nations and contained no 
enforcement provisions. It is, therefore, considered legally nonbinding. However, the treaty included 
provisions for updates (called “protocols”) that would set mandatory emission limits. The principal update 
is the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, after intensive negotiations. 
Most industrialized nations and some Central European economies in transition agreed to legally binding 
reductions in GHG emissions of an average of 6 to 8 percent below 1990 levels between the years 2008 
and 2012, which was defined as the first emission budget period. The United States is the only Annex 1 
country that has not ratified the agreement. 
As of October 2008, a total of 183 countries and governmental entities had ratified the agreement 
(representing over 61.6 percent of emissions from Annex I countries). Other countries, such as India and 
China, that have ratified the protocol, are not required to reduce emissions under the present agreement 
despite their relatively large populations and high levels of pollution. China, India, and other developing 
countries were exempted from the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol because they were not the main 
contributors to the GHG emissions during the industrialization period, which is believed to be causing 
today’s climate change.  
A recent world meeting on climate change, which took place in Bali, Indonesia, in December 
2007, reaffirms that there will be a market for carbon trading beyond 2012. Major outcomes of the Bali 
meeting include a commitment by developing countries to include mitigation plans, dependant on 
developed-country actions, in the next global climate agreement and a new consensus on the importance 
of avoided deforestation in reducing future emissions (World Bank 2008).  
In addition to markets operating under the Kyoto Protocol, there are several other distinct carbon 
schemes or markets in operation today. Thus, rather than a single carbon market, several carbon markets 
operate simultaneously, with linkages among them. These schemes all use market-based mechanisms to 
allocate and trade carbon credits that represent a reduction of CO2 emissions. Carbon transactions are 
defined as purchase contracts in which one party pays another party in return for GHG emission 
reductions or for the right to release a given amount of GHG emissions that the buyer can use to meet its 
compliance or corporate citizenship objectives vis-à-vis climate-change mitigation. Payment is made 
                                                      
2 The following sections are based primarily on information in a recent assessment by the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit 
(Capoor and Ambrosi 2006, 2007, 2008) on the state of and trends in carbon markets. 
3 Annex 1 parties to the UNFCCC are industrialized countries that were members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, 




using one or more of the following forms: cash, equity, debt, convertible debt or warrant, or in-kind 
contributions such as providing technologies to abate GHG emissions. Carbon transactions can be 
grouped into two main categories: allowance-based and project-based. Transactions can also be 
categorized by whether the transaction is intended to meet emission limits under the Kyoto Protocol. See 
Table 2 for a classification of carbon markets by type of transaction: allowance- versus project-based and 
Kyoto-compliant versus voluntary. 
Table 2. Classification of carbon markets by transaction type and Kyoto compliance 
   Trade in Emission Allowances Project-Based  Transactions 
Kyoto-compliant  Trade in carbon offsets under European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme 
UK Emissions Trading System 
All Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation projects 
Voluntary, not for 
compliance under 
Kyoto 
Trade in emission reductions on Chicago 
Climate Exchange  
New South Wales Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Scheme 
Voluntary reduction projects, such as 
carbon sequestration projects in Africa 
Source: Jindal, Swallow, and Kerr 2006 
2.1. Allowance-Based Transactions  
With allowance-based transactions, the buyer purchases emission allowances created and allocated (or 
auctioned) by regulators under cap-and-trade regimes, such as Assigned Amount Units
4 (AAUs) under the 
Kyoto Protocol, or EU Allowances
5 (EUAs) under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
6 (EU ETS). Such 
schemes combine environmental performance (defined by the actual level of caps set) and flexibility, 
through trading, in order for the mandated participants to meet compliance requirements at the lowest 
possible cost.  
Countries that ratify the Kyoto Protocol and accept national limits are allocated AAUs. They then 
implement their emission targets by allocating quotas to various emitting activities or industrial entities, 
such as a power plant or paper factory. The EU ETS, the first and largest allowance-based carbon market, 
was designed to reduce CO2 emissions of EU member countries (see Table 1 for volumes and values of 
transactions). The first phase (January 2005–December 2007) was designed to develop the infrastructure 
for carbon trading in the European Union and to prepare EU countries to meet their commitments under 
the first commitment phase of the Kyoto Protocol (January 2008–December 2012). Emissions were 
capped at 6,600 MtCO2e over the period. As can be seen in Table 1, in its third year (2007), the EU ETS 
saw over 2 billion allowances changing hands, a sixfold increase over 2005, for a financial value of over 
US$50 billion. The sectors included under the EU ETS (including the power and heat sector, minerals, 
metals, and oil and gas industries) comprise about half of EU CO2 emissions, while GHG emissions from 
sources not included in the EU ETS, notably transportation and buildings, were to be limited by other 
policies and measures (Ellerman and Joskow 2008).  
                                                      
4 An Assigned Amount Unit is equal to 1 tCO2e. If, for example, an industry is given an emission cap of 80 tons by a 
regulator and it is able to reduce the production to 70 tons, then the remaining 10 tons can be traded in the form of AAU units. 
5 An EU Allowance is equal to 1 tCO2e. 
6 The Kyoto Protocol enables a group of several Annex I countries to join together to create a so-called “bubble” or cluster 
of countries that is given an overall emissions cap and is treated as a single entity for compliance purposes. The European Union 
elected to be treated as such a group and created the EU ETS as a market within a market. The EU ETS’s currency is the EUA 
(EU Allowance). The first phase of the scheme was in operation from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2007, and the second 




Challenges from Phase I included an overallocation of allowances due to a lack of accurate data 
at the outset of the program, volatility in carbon prices,
7 and an increase in electricity prices due to 
electric power generators that passed along costs to consumers (ibid.). Given the experiences of Phase I, a 
number of changes will be implemented during Phase II, including no free allowances to the power 
sector, greater auctioning of allowances, and extension to new sectors, countries, and GHGs (Capoor and 
Ambrosi 2008).  
The UK established its own voluntary allowance-based scheme, the UK Emissions Trading 
System, which ran from 2002 to 2006. The goals of the scheme were to secure cost-effective GHG 
emission reductions, give UK companies experience in emission trading in preparation for the EU ETS, 
and encourage the establishment of an emission trading center in London (Enviros 2006). Participation 
was voluntary and open to both the public and private sectors. Participants in the UK scheme had the 
option of applying to opt out of the first phase of the EU ETS. While the scheme provided early 
experience in emission trading, there is some concern that the scheme did not achieve significant emission 
reductions given the voluntary nature of the program, concern regarding the complexity of some aspects 
of the rules, and uncertainty over the time horizon of the scheme (ibid.).  
Other allowance-based markets include Australia’s New South Wales (NSW) Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Scheme (GGAS), which began in January 2003 and is focused mainly on reducing GHG 
emissions from the power sector. A statewide GHG benchmark is set for the electricity sector, and then 
retailers and large electricity customers in NSW and in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) are 
required (since January 2005) to meet mandatory targets to reduce or offset the emission of GHGs arising 
from the production of electricity they supply or use, based on their share of electricity demand. Targets 
are met by purchasing certificates (NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificates,
8 or NGACs) created by 
accredited abatement certificate providers through project-based emission-reduction activities. NGACs 
are generated through the following activities: low-emission generation of electricity and improved 
generator efficiency, activities that result in reduced consumption of electricity or on-site generation of 
electricity, and carbon sequestration through forests. In 2007, after ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Australian government announced that it would introduce a domestic emission trading scheme by 2010. It 
is anticipated that the NSW scheme will be integrated into the new national scheme with more ambitious 
targets. 
The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a voluntary but legally binding
9 commitment- and 
allowance-based carbon market. The commodity traded on the CCX is the Carbon Financial Instrument 
(CFI) contract.
10 CFI contracts are comprised of exchange allowances—which are issued to emitting 
members in accordance with their emission baseline and the CCX Emission Reduction Schedule—and 
exchange offsets, which are project-based credits (discussed in the following section). By the end of 
Phase I in December 2006, all members were to have reduced direct emissions by 4 percent below a 
baseline period of 1998–2001 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006, 2007). Phase II, which extends the CCX 
reduction program through 2010, will require all members to reduce GHG emissions by 6 percent below 
the baseline by 2010 (ibid.). 
                                                      
7 The price per ton of CO2 or equivalent has varied over time and reached a peak in spring 2006 of around 30 euros per ton 
of CO2 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006, 2007). High allowance prices, driven largely by high global energy costs, dropped 
precipitously in April 2006 upon the release of more accurate, verified emission data. Late in the trial phase (May 2007), there 
was another sharp decline in allowance prices because there were no provisions for banking emission reductions for use in the 
second phase of the program (Ellerman and Joskow 2008).  
8 1 NGAC = 1 tCO2e 
9 Compliance with the CCX Emission Reduction Schedule is enforced by the CCX Environmental Compliance Committee 
and is monitored and verified by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Members whose emissions do not meet 
annual emission-reduction targets must use banked allowances from previous years or purchase CFI contracts on the CCX 
electronic trading platform to meet their compliance requirements. 




2.2. Project-Based Transactions  
With project-based transactions, the buyer purchases emission credits from a project that can verifiably 
demonstrate GHG emission reductions compared with the level of emissions that would have been 
produced in the absence of the project. The most notable examples of such activities are under the CDM 
and the Joint Implementation (JI) schemes of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Next to the EU ETS, the largest emission reductions have come from the CDM and, to a lesser 
extent, the JI (see Table 1). An overwhelming majority (about 91 percent) of primary transactions for 
project-based credits have come from CDM activities, which reduced emissions by 791 MtCO2e in 2007, 
more than double 2005 volumes (see Table 1). The CDM is an arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Article 12) allowing countries with GHG reduction commitments (Annex I countries) to invest in 
emission-reducing projects in developing countries as an alternative to making more costly emission 
reductions in their own countries. JI is a similar arrangement, which allows Annex 1 countries to invest in 
emission-reduction projects in other Annex 1 countries. Generally this tends to lead to investments in 
emission-reducing projects in countries with economies in transition, such as the Russian Federation, the 
Baltic states, and several Central and Eastern European states (see the Appendix for more details on the 
CDM). Despite a more than twofold increase in the volume of transactions traded over the 2005–2007 
period, the dynamic of the project-based market is currently changing, as buyers have become more 
cautious due to delivery and issuance challenges, the current global financial crisis, and continuing 
uncertainty about the role of the CDM and JI after 2012; consequently, the number of projects in the 
pipeline has decreased from its peak in July 2007 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). 
Once the project-based credits are issued and delivered, they are at that time fundamentally the 
same as allowances. Unlike allowances, however, project-based credits are compliance assets that need to 
be “created” through a process that has certain inherent risks (for instance, regulation, project 
development, and performance) and can involve significantly higher transaction costs. Such risks are 
addressed through contractual provisions that define how they are allocated between parties, and these 
risks, along with other factors, are reflected in the value of the transaction. 
There is also a growing retail carbon segment that sells emission reductions to individuals and 
companies seeking to offset their own carbon emission footprints. Reports of increased interest on the part 
of banks, credit card issuers, private equity funds, and others suggest that this segment could grow 
exponentially if only there were a credible, voluntary standard for such assets. 
According to recent assessments by Capoor and Ambrosi (2006, 2007), the main buyers of 
project-based credits are European private buyers interested in the EU ETS, government buyers interested 
in Kyoto compliance, Japanese companies with voluntary commitments under the Keidanren Voluntary 
Action Plan,
11 U.S. multinationals operating in Japan and Europe or preparing in advance for the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeastern U.S. states or the California Assembly Bill 32
12 
establishing a statewide cap on emissions, power retailers and large consumers regulated by the NSW 
market in Australia, and North American companies with voluntary but legally binding compliance 
objectives in the CCX. 
There is also a growing retail carbon segment that sells emission reductions to individuals and 
companies seeking to offset their own carbon emission footprints. Reports of increased interest on the part 
of banks, credit card issuers, private equity funds, and others suggest that this segment could grow 
exponentially if only there were a credible, voluntary standard for such assets. 
                                                      
11 This plan, which covers a wide range of industries, is a voluntary effort devised by the Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business 
Federation) in which each industry uses its own discretion to set targets for GHGs. 
12 This bill requires the state board to adopt regulations to require the reporting and verification of statewide GHG emissions 




2.2.1. The CDM  
CDM projects produce Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), and JI projects produce Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs). CERs and ERUs
13 are overwhelmingly bought from project developers by funds 
or individual entities, rather than being exchange-traded like EUAs. Because the creation of these 
instruments is subject to a lengthy process of registration and certification by the UN, and the projects 
themselves require several years to develop, this market is at this point almost completely a forward 
market in which purchases are made at a deep discount to their equivalent currency and are almost always 
subject to certification and delivery (although up-front payments are sometimes made). A CDM project 
must provide evidence that emission reductions are additional to any reductions that would have occurred 
without the project. Thus, projects must pass through a rigorous public registration and issuance process 
and be approved by designated national authorities.
14 The CDM is overseen by an executive board. 
Major CDM assets and technologies transacted include industrial gases; methane (CH4); clean 
energy; land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF); and agroforestry credits. Table 3 presents a 
complete list of projects eligible for the CDM. 
Table 3. Categories of projects that are CDM activities 
1.  Energy industries (renewable or nonrenewable sources) 
2.  Energy distribution 
3.  Energy demand 
4.  Manufacturing industries 
5.  Chemical industries 
6.  Construction 
7.  Transport 
8.  Mining and mineral production 
9.   Metal production 
10.Fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil, and gas) 
11. Fugitive emissions from production and consumption of 
halocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride 
12. Solvent use 
13. Waste handling and disposal 
14. Afforestation and reforestation 
15. Agriculture 
Source: Jindal, Swallow, and Kerr 2006 
According to the World Bank (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008), the volumes transacted from clean-
energy projects (renewable energy, fuel switching, and energy efficiency) reached 358 MtCO2e in 2007 
(64% market share, compared to just 33% in 2006 and 14% in 2005). Energy-efficiency projects at large 
industrial facilities account for the majority of these emission-reduction transactions (Figure 1). However, 
                                                      
13 One CER and one ERU are each equal to 1 tCO2e. Note that there are two categories of CDM: primary and secondary. 
The primary CDM transaction refers to the first sale of CERs from the project owner to the buyer, and the secondary CDM (or 
secondary CER market) refers to a situation in which a secondary seller sells guaranteed CER (gCER) contracts that are secured 
through a slice of its carbon portfolios. This includes primary project developers providing project-specific guarantees, often 
along with credit enhancement through the balance sheet of a highly rated bank (Capoor and Ambrosi 2007, 2008).   
14 Designated operational entities at the national level have the role of verifying whether the project contributed to 
sustainable development objectives. Public funding for CDM project activities must not result in the diversion of official 




high up-front costs and unnecessary monitoring complexity have limited the expansion of demand-side 
energy-efficiency projects. Industrial gases have become less important in the CDM market: projects for 
the destruction of hydrofluorocarbon 23 (HFC23)
15 have continued to decrease, from a 67 percent share 
of the CDM market in 2005 to 34 percent and 8 percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively. Projects for the 
destruction of nitrous oxide (N2O),
16 another potent GHG with high global-warming potential, started to 
appear in the transaction database in 2006. N2O projects captured a 13 percent share of volumes 
transacted in 2006 and 9 percent in 2007.  
Projects for the reduction of coal mine methane (CMM)
17 and landfill gas (LFG) projects each 
represent 5 percent of the CDM market. CMM constitutes a larger share of the JI market, with a 27 
percent market share. LFG
18 projects showed weak project performance and delivery yield (which is the 
ratio of actually issued CERs to the expected emission reductions) in the early set of issued CERs. 
Reasons cited include, among others, overestimation of the potential generation of gas at the modeling 
stage, inadequate design of gas capture systems, suboptimal operation of the landfills, and other external 
factors. In addition to low performance yields, other barriers to LFG projects include the lack of 
awareness and capacity of municipalities and the absence of appropriate regulatory frameworks (Capoor 
and Ambrosi 2008).  
Figure 1. Share of CDM project types 
 
Source: Capoor and Ambrosi 2008 
Note: CMM=coal mine methane, LFG=landfill gas, HFC= hydrofluorocarbon, EE=energy efficiency 
                                                      
15 HFC23 is a by-product of the manufacture of the refrigerant hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) 22. HFC23-destruction 
projects provide a cheap way to make money in a small number of industrial sites in a handful of developing countries. However, 
they provide little discernible sustainable development benefit to those countries. 
16 N2O is an unwanted by-product of the manufacture of nitric acid in chemical processing plants. It is a potent GHG with 
strong warming potential. 
17 Methane (CH4) is produced from underground and surface mines, and as a result of post-mining activities, including coal 
processing, storage, and transportation. It is a potent GHG, and a range of projects have been developed to reduce CH4 
emissions, including natural gas pipeline injection, electric power production, co-firing in boilers, district heating, mine heating, 
coal drying, vehicle fuel, flaring, and manufacturing and industrial uses such as feedstock for carbon black, methanol, and 
dimethyl ether production.  




Carbon credits delivered from renewable energy have been increasing since 2005: in 2007, 
hydropower projects constituted 12 percent of the CDM market, followed by wind projects at 7 percent 
and biomass projects at 5 percent. Carbon assets from agroforestry and LULUCF were only 0.1 percent of 
CDM volumes transacted in 2007 due to their regulatory complexity and limited market access to the EU 
(ibid.).19 However, the proven community benefits and competitive costs20 may result in some 
additional demand from public buyers, including European governments and those in Japan, New 
Zealand, and Canada. 
Moreover, eligible LULUCF activities are limited to afforestation and reforestation, which further 
explains the dearth of projects in this category. Large classes of LULUCF assets, including soil carbon 
sequestration, fire management, and avoided deforestation, are attractive opportunities to promote 
sustainable development in Africa and in other natural resource–based economies but are excluded from 
the CDM and other regulatory markets (Harris 2006). 
2.2.2. The CCX 
The CCX also accepts project-based credits called exchange offsets, which are generated by qualifying 
offset projects. Offset projects can be registered by members,
21 offset providers, and offset aggregators. 
Offset providers and offset aggregators do not have significant GHG emissions but can register offset 
projects and sell the exchange offsets created.
22 The inclusion of offsets is intended to expand market 
participation to include sectors and locations not subject to an emissions cap, optimize the market so that 
the maximum GHG mitigation is generated per dollar spent, and realize important ecological and social 
co-benefits, such as local environmental improvement and greater economic opportunities in developing 
countries. The CCX has developed simple, standardized rules for issuing CFI contracts for several types 
of projects: agricultural methane, coal mine methane, landfill methane, agricultural soil carbon, rangeland 
soil carbon management, forestry, renewable energy, and destruction of ozone-depleting substances. 
Projects related to energy efficiency and projects eligible for the CDM are approved on a project-by-
project basis (CCX 2008). All CCX projects are subject to verification of eligibility and performance 
by qualified independent entities.
23  
Eligible projects for carbon emission reductions via agricultural soil carbon sequestration include 
continuous conservation tillage and grass planting. Conservation tillage projects must meet a minimum 
five-year contractual commitment to continuous no-till or strip-till and leave at least two-thirds of the soil 
surface undisturbed and at least two-thirds of the residue remaining on the field surface. CFI contracts are 
issued for conservation tillage at a rate between 0.2 and 0.6 metric tons of CO2 per acre per year, and 
carbon sequestration projects must be enrolled through a CCX-registered offset aggregator.  
Contracts for forest carbon emission reductions are issued for projects involving reducing 
deforestation and degradation, afforestation and reforestation, forest management to increase stand- and 
landscape-level carbon density, and increasing off-site carbon stocks in wood products and enhancing 
product fuel substitution (CCX 2008). Managed forest projects (reducing deforestation and degradation), 
which are not included in other exchanges, earn offsets for the additional net carbon sequestered in their 
forest stocks from the previous year (i.e., carbon sequestered from additional forest growth less carbon 
lost due to harvesting activities). In order to earn offsets, forest owners must (1) provide evidence that all 
                                                      
19 The EU ETS currently does not allow market access for any assets from LULUCF activities.  
20 LULUCF emission-reduction purchase agreements typically include post-2012 vintages and discount prices to allow for 
replacement credits. 
21 Entities that have significant GHG emissions are eligible to submit offset project proposals only if they are CCX members 
that have committed to reduce their own emissions.  
22 Offset projects involving less than 10,000 tCO2e per year should be registered and sold through an offset aggregator.  
23 A diverse group of international entities have been authorized to provide project verification. Verifiers inspect project 
performance data (e.g., metered methane flows, electricity production data, tree measurements, visual inspection) and 
calculations to confirm a project’s actual annual GHG destruction, sequestration, or emission avoidance (e.g., due to energy 
efficiency or renewable energy projects). An offset project is subject to initial verification as well as annual verification for the 




their forest holdings are sustainably managed through certification from agencies or schemes endorsed by 
the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification schemes (PEFC) Council or through other 
certification schemes approved by the CCX Committee on Forestry, (2) quantify sequestered carbon 
either using a growth-and-yield model or by calculating inventory on an annual basis, and (3) pass a case-
by-case review by the CCX Committee on Forestry.  
Thus, a wider range of projects are considered eligible for inclusion in the CCX compared to 
other carbon markets, including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, 
which is specifically designed to include developing countries. Including emission reductions from 
projects related to agricultural soil carbon sequestration and forestry provides an opportunity for 
participation by countries in SSA. 
2.2.3. Other Voluntary Markets 
Outside the CCX, there are a wide range of voluntary transactions that take place but are not driven by 
any emissions cap. These markets, therefore, do not trade in allowances, but rather purchase project-
created offsets or credits. These credits are often referred to as verified (or voluntary) emission reductions 
(VERs), or simply as carbon offsets. However, voluntary buyers may also purchase credits from the 
compliance markets or the CCX. In 2007, offset-generating projects were very diverse, with the largest 
share of projects related to energy efficiency (18 percent), renewable energy (20 percent), methane 
destruction
24 (16 percent), and forestry or land-based projects (18 percent) (Hamilton et al. 2008). 
Forestry and land-based projects include projects related to afforestation/reforestation (10 percent), 
avoided deforestation (5 percent), and agricultural soil carbon sequestration (3 percent). The volume 
transacted in voluntary markets increased dramatically from 5 MtCO2e in 2005 to 42 MtCO2e in 2007 
(see Table 1). 
Buyers enter voluntary markets in order to manage their climate-change impacts, to improve 
public relations, to prepare for upcoming regulation, to resell credits at a profit, or for philanthropic 
purposes. Suppliers in the offset market include retailers selling offsets online, conservation organizations 
hoping to harness the power of carbon finance, developers of potential JI or CDM projects with credits 
that for a variety of reasons cannot currently be sold into the regulated markets, project developers 
primarily interested in generating VERs, and aggregators of credits (Hamilton et al. 2008). Sellers can be 
categorized into three major types: project developers that develop GHG emission reductions through 
offset projects, aggregators or wholesalers that sell offsets in bulk and often have ownership of a portfolio 
of credits, and retailers who sell small amounts of credits to individuals or organizations, often online, and 
have ownership of a portfolio of credits. In some cases, brokers are involved to facilitate transactions 
between sellers and buyers (ibid.).  
2.3. The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit 
In an effort to ensure that developing countries benefit from international efforts to address climate 
change, the World Bank has also become involved in carbon financing and capacity building (WBCFU 
2006). The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (WBCFU) purchases project-based GHG emission 
reductions in developing countries and countries with economies in transition using contributions from 
governments and companies in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries. The emission reductions are purchased through one of the World Bank–managed carbon funds 
on behalf of the contributor, and within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM or JI scheme.  
These carbon funds—including the Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF), the 
BioCarbon Fund, and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)—specifically target poorer countries 
and, in the case of the BioCarbon Fund, rural areas of developing countries. The CDCF, which became 
operational in March 2003, supports projects that combine community-development attributes with 
emission reductions to create “development plus carbon” credits, and will significantly improve the lives 
                                                      




of the poor and their local environment. The BioCarbon Fund, which started in May 2004, aims to 
enhance the role of LULUCF emission-reduction projects within carbon markets and the CDM. By 
targeting projects that sequester or conserve GHGs in forests and agro-ecosystems, the BioCarbon Fund is 
intended to extend the benefits of the carbon market to the poorest rural areas and to the local 
environment (BioCarbon Fund 2007). The FCPF was launched at the UNFCCC meeting in Bali, 
Indonesia, in December 2007 but has not yet been operationalized. The FCPF focuses on reducing 
emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) by estimating national forest carbon stocks, 
monitoring sources of forest emissions, and implementing a carbon finance mechanism through which 
developing countries would be paid for measurable and verifiable emission reductions (WBCFU 2008). 
Unlike other World Bank development products that lend or grant funds to projects, the Carbon 
Finance Unit purchases emission reductions, paying for them periodically, following verification by a 
third-party auditor. By facilitating the participation of developing countries and economies in transition in 
the emerging carbon market, the World Bank aims to make progress toward reducing poverty through 
environment and energy initiatives. In particular, the Carbon Finance Unit intends to reduce the 
transaction costs of global carbon markets, support sustainable development, and extend the benefits of 




3.  AFRICA’S SHARE OF GLOBAL CARBON MARKETS AND POTENTIAL 
As the largest project-based market with a focus on developing countries, the CDM provides the largest 
market for carbon offset projects in SSA countries. On the demand side, European buyers dominated the 
CDM market in 2007, with 90 percent of volumes transacted (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). This was a 
change over 2005, when Japanese and European buyers had a similar market share. According to a recent 
World Bank assessment, within Europe, the UK had a 59 percent share of volumes transacted on the 
CDM (up from 15 percent in 2005), consolidating its leadership position as the carbon finance hub for the 
world. Private sector players were the main buyers of CDM assets in 2006, with 79 percent of CDM 
volumes transacted in 2007. On the supply side, China dominated the CDM market in 2007, with about 
73 percent of CDM volumes transacted, followed by India (6 percent), Brazil (6 percent), the rest of Asia 
(5 percent), and the rest of Latin America (5 percent) (Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). In 2007, Africa’s share 
was 5 percent, with nearly two-thirds of that volume being from either North Africa or South Africa. The 
other countries of SSA account for just over 10 MtCO2e (ibid.).  
The above information indicates a systematic bias in favor of large, industrial opportunities in the 
current global carbon market. Despite some notable gains over the past year, African projects still 
represent a small fraction of the entire CDM pipeline (Robinson and O’Brien 2007). Africa’s share of the 
CDM market increased from 3 percent in 2005 and 2006 to 5 percent in 2007 (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006, 
2007, 2008). At the end of October 2008, 27 projects from Africa (and only 17 from SSA) were registered 
by the CDM, out of a total of 1,186 projects for all developing countries (ibid.). In terms of volumes, 
contracted projects in Africa amount to about 50 MtCO2e, with more than 20 MtCO2e transacted in 2007 
alone. Most of the investments in SSA are directed toward South Africa (ibid.).  
Africa’s share of the projects funded by the WBCFU is somewhat higher. Out of a total of 90 
projects that have received Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPAs),
25 16 projects are in SSA 
countries (i.e., 18 percent). While this represents an improvement over the CDM, there remains some 
difficulty in expanding carbon business in much of Africa, given the current restrictions on LULUCF 
projects, where Africa might have a comparative advantage.  
However, Africa has significant mitigation potential, particularly in the agriculture and forestry 
sectors and has demonstrated innovation with projects in the areas of afforestation and reforestation. 
These projects will sequester GHGs and also direct financial benefits to members of the local 
communities from the payment for environmental services and the trade in nontimber forest products (see 
Capoor and Ambrosi [2006] for a detailed description of the projects). These projects include the Green 
Belt Movement Project in Kenya, which will reforest 1,800 hectares of indigenous species and is 
expected to sequester about 0.375 MtCO2e by 2017. The project is also expected to reduce erosion, 
protect water sources, regulate water flows, and improve biodiversity. In addition, the Andasibe-Mantadia 
Biodiversity Corridor Project in Madagascar, which combines reforestation of 3,020 hectares with an 
avoided-deforestation component, is expected to restore degraded soils and lands and stabilize 
hydrological flows through the creation of biodiversity corridors between protected reserves and to 
improve native species, while sequestering approximately 0.2 MtCO2e. Third, the Acacia Plantations 
Project in Niger will develop 8,800 hectares of degraded land, mostly managed by local communities, to 
promote sustainable agroforestry and is expected to sequester about 0.5 MtCO2e. Fourth, the Nile Basin 
Reforestation Project in Uganda will establish a plantation of pine and mixed native species in grassland 
areas and is expected to sequester around 0.11 MtCO2e by 2012 and around 0.26 MtCO2e by 2017. 
Projects under the BioCarbon Fund administered by the World Bank include two soil carbon 
sequestration projects in western Kenya.  
Thus, opportunities in SSA that have the potential to contribute to real emission reductions 
through projects in these sectors should be further explored and made part of the CDM and other carbon 
markets. Yet a number of constraints, as discussed below, hinder greater SSA participation in global 
                                                      




carbon markets. Facilitating the participation of SSA in the CDM and other carbon markets would 
encourage the development of innovative ways to sequester carbon and deliver strong local community, 
environmental, and economic benefits (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006). However, greater participation by 
SSA countries in the CDM would require a revision of the CDM rules, which tend to exclude the types of 




4.  EMISSION STATUS AND TRENDS 
4.1. Emission Status 
While SSA’s contribution to global emissions is relatively small, there is potential for SSA to contribute 
to climate-change mitigation, particularly in the forestry and agriculture sectors. This section discusses 
the contributions of land-use change and agriculture to global GHG emissions and presents SSA’s 
potential to contribute to GHG emission reductions.  
Population and economic growth have placed pressure on agriculture to produce more food. The 
resulting growth in food production has had serious implications for the environment and natural 
resources. Over the last four decades, the area of land occupied by agriculture has increased dramatically 
in developing countries and is projected to increase into the future (see Table 4), particularly in Africa and 
Latin America, where there is a greater amount of uncultivated arable land (Smith et al. 2007a).  
Table 4. Agricultural land use in the last four decades 
   Agricultural Area (M ha)  Change 1960s–
2000s 
  1961–70 1971–80 1981–90 1991–2000 2001–05  Percent  M  ha 
Africa  1,057 1,071 1,085  1,111  1,137 8 80 
   Eastern Africa  288  297  301  292  298  4  10 
   Central Africa  156  157  159  159  160  2  4 
   Northern Africa  207  212  216  233  240  16  33 
   Southern Africa  167  164  163  167  168  1  1 
    Western  Africa 240 241 246  259  271  13  32 
Americas  1,098 1,139 1,172  1,198  1,203  10  105 
Asia  1,078 1,129 1,237  1,618  1,686  56  608 
Europe  783 781 781  520  481  -39  -302 
Least-developed 
countries 
725 734 746  761  782  8  57 
World  4,506 4,623 4,768  4,928  4,972  10  467 
Source: FAOSTAT 2008 
Note: M ha = million hectares 
Land-use change accounts for a significant portion of GHG emissions, including CO2, N2O, and 
CH4. According to Lal (2004), the conversion of natural ecosystems into agricultural areas depletes the 
carbon content in soils by as much as 75 percent. Deforestation and other land-use changes are 
responsible for a large share of CO2 emissions, while agricultural activities such as microbial decay or the 
burning of plant litter and soil organic matter also contribute a small amount (less than 1 percent) (Smith 
et al. 2007a).  
Agricultural production contributes 13 percent of GHG emissions (see Figure 1). This share 
includes a large amount of non-CO2 emissions: in 2005, agriculture contributed about 47 and 58 percent 
of total emissions of CH2 and N2O, respectively (Smith et al. 2007a). N2O emissions come mainly from 
fertilizers and manure applied to soils and accounted for 38 percent of total non-CO2 emissions from 
agriculture in 2005 (USEPA 2006a). CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation (livestock) account for the 
largest share of non-CO2 emissions in agriculture, accounting for 32 percent of total non-CO2 emissions 
in 2005 (ibid.). Biomass burning (12 percent), rice production (11 percent), and manure management (7 




While these two sets of activities (LULUCF and agricultural production) are often dealt with 
separately in the literature and in practice (by the forestry and agriculture sectors), the two are closely 
related, as increasing demand for food production triggers land-use changes such as deforestation to make 
way for expanding agricultural lands. In addition, options for mitigating GHG emissions overlap both sets 
of activities. For instance, better cropland management to increase the productivity of agricultural lands 
will also reduce the conversion of forest to agricultural lands.  
Figure 2 shows that LULUCF and agricultural production together accounted for 31 percent of 
global GHG emissions in 2000. While developed countries are responsible for the majority of emissions 
from the energy sector, developing countries are largely responsible for emissions from agricultural 
production and LULUCF. Figures 3 and 4 show how GHG emissions vary by region, with Asia and South 
America as the largest emitters of GHGs from agriculture and LULUCF. Sub-Saharan Africa also 
contributes 6 percent of global emissions from agriculture and 15 percent of emissions from land-use 
change and forestry. 















Source: Data drawn from WRI 2008 
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Source: Data drawn from WRI 2008 
Globally, emissions of CH4 and N2O from agriculture increased by 17 percent from 1990 to 2005 
(USEPA 2006a). The increase in global emissions from agricultural production was driven by developing 
countries; while emissions from agriculture in developed countries are decreasing, emissions from 
agriculture in developing countries are on the rise, canceling out the reductions made in developed 
countries over the 1990–2005 period (ibid.). While SSA’s contribution to GHG emissions through 
agriculture is relatively small (6 percent of the global total), there is potential to further reduce emissions. 
Similarly, between 2000 and 2005 global deforestation continued at an alarming rate of 12.9 million 
hectares per year due to the expansion of agricultural land and settlements, infrastructure development, 
and unsustainable logging practices—although this rate represents a slight decrease in deforestation from 
the rate of 13.1 million hectares per year in the 1990s (Nabuurs et al. 2007). Taking afforestation and 
reforestation efforts into consideration, the net loss of forest areas is somewhat less: 7.3 million hectares 
per year between 2000 and 2005 and 8.9 million hectares per year in the 1990s (ibid.). The net decreases 
in forest areas are driven mainly by forest biomass decreases in developing regions (particularly Africa, 
Asia, and South America); forest areas are expanding in developed regions such as Europe and North 
America (ibid.). Table 5 shows the declining carbon stock in living biomass in Africa and other 
developing countries. 
Table 5. Carbon stock in living biomass 
  Carbon Stock in Living Biomass (MtCO2) 
Region 1990  2000  2005 
Africa 241,267  228,067  222,933 
Asia 150,700  130,533  119,533 
Europe 154,000  158,033  160,967 
North and Central America  150,333  153,633  155,467 
Oceana 42,533  41,800  41,800 
South America  358,233  345,400  335,500 
World 1,097,067  1,057,067  1,036,200 
Source: Nabuurs et al. 2007 




However, the extent to which carbon stock losses due to deforestation in tropical zones are offset 
by expanding forest areas in the boreal and temperate zones is an area of disagreement among 
researchers, particularly between studies that use land observations and those that use top-down models, 
which tend to produce higher estimates of carbon sinks (ibid.). 
4.2. Emission Trends (Baseline Scenarios) 
GHG emissions from agriculture are expected to increase in the future, given increasing demand for 
agricultural products and changing food preferences (USEPA 2006b). Table 6 presents the baseline trends 
for emissions of N2O and CH4 from various agricultural activities. In each of these activities, GHG 
emissions are projected to increase from their 1990 levels. N2O emissions are projected to increase by 35–
60 percent by 2030 due to increased nitrogen fertilizer use and animal manure production (Smith et al. 
2007a). Given the increase in meat consumption associated with economic growth, livestock production 
is expected to increase, leading to an increase in CH4 emissions of 60 percent by 2030 (ibid.). Verchot 
(2007) estimates that total non-CO2 emissions from agriculture will also be 60 percent higher in 2030 than 
they were in 1990. N2O increases will be driven mainly by agricultural soils, while CH4 emission 
increases can be attributed to enteric fermentation and rice production. 
Table 6. Baseline for non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (MtCO2e) by source through 2030 
 Year 
Source  1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
N2O  soil  2,284 2,405 2,610 2,782 2,996 3,252 3,542 3,774 4,006 
N2O  manure  196 199 205 219 230 246 261 274 288 
CH4 enteric 
fermentation 
1,772 1,804 1,799 1,929 2,079 2,204 2,344 2,473 2,601 
CH4  manure  223 225 225 235 244 257 269 282 294 
CH4  other  268 274 455 456 456 456 456 456 456 
CH4  rice  601 621 634 672 708 744 776 812 848 
Global  total  5,343 5,528 5,928 6,291 6,713 7,158 7,648 8,071 8,493 
Source: Verchot 2007 
Note: CH4 = methane; CO2 = carbon dioxide; MtCO2e = mega tons of carbon dioxide or equivalent; N2O = nitrous oxide 
While forest areas in industrialized countries are projected to increase by 60 to 230 million 
hectares between 2000 and 2050, this increase will be offset by decreases in forest areas in developing 
regions of 200 to 490 million hectares over the same period (MEA 2005). A baseline scenario regarding 
global GHG emissions from the forestry sector is harder to establish given a lack of consensus on factors 
that control the carbon balance and is the subject of much research (Nabuurs et al. 2007). Estimates of 
GHG emissions and removals from the forestry sector vary widely across studies based on land-use types 




5.  MITIGATION POTENTIAL IN AGRICULTURE AND LULUCF  
5.1. Agriculture 
There have been many attempts to estimate the potential technical and economic emissions savings from 
mitigation measures in agriculture. Technical potential refers to the amount of GHG emission savings 
possible in the absence of any political, economic or other constraints. Economic potential refers to the 
amount of GHG emission savings that would occur through market transactions given various carbon 
prices. Many studies focus on mitigation potential from soil carbon sequestration. Considering all GHGs, 
Smith et al. (2008) estimate that by 2030 the technical potential for mitigation through agriculture is 
between 5,500 and 6,000 MtCO2e and the economic potential is between 1,500 and 4,300 MtCO2e at a 
range of carbon prices (up to US$100 per tCO2e). The report further estimates that of this total mitigation 
potential, 89 percent is from carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and 9 percent and 2 percent are 
from mitigation of CH4 and N2O, respectively (ibid.).  
Smith et al. (2008) estimate the potential GHG savings by 2030 for the most prominent mitigation 
options in agriculture (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Potential savings by 2030 from mitigation options in agriculture for carbon prices of up to 
US$100 per ton of carbon dioxide or equivalent 
 
Source: Smith et al. 2008 
Note: MtCO2e = mega tons of carbon dioxide or equivalent 
Considering all gases, the researchers find that the global technical mitigation potential from 
agriculture by 2030 is estimated to be 5,500–6,000 MtCO2e per year. Of the total mitigation potential, 
about 89 percent is from reduced soil emissions of CO2, about 9 percent is from mitigation of CH4, and 
about 2 percent is from mitigation of soil N2O emissions. Similarly, Caldeira et al. (2004) estimate 
technical savings of approximately 4,500 MtCO2e per year, considering no economic or other barriers.  
Economic potential, which takes carbon trading into consideration, varies according to carbon 
prices and is estimated at 1,500–1,600, 2,500–2,700, and 4,000-4,300 MtCO2e per year at carbon prices 




Smith et al., the technical potential for mitigation through agriculture in Africa is 970 MtCO2e per year by 
2030, and the economic potential (assuming prices of up to US$20 per tCO2e) is 265 MtCO2e. 
GHG emissions could be further reduced by substituting agricultural feedstocks (e.g., crop 
residues, dung, and dedicated energy crops) for fossil fuels for energy production. The economic 
mitigation potential of biomass energy from agriculture is estimated to be 640, 2,240, and 16,000 MtCO2e 
per year at up to US$20, up to US$50, and up to US$100 per tCO2e, respectively (ibid.).  
While the total biophysical potential of approximately 5,500–6,000 MtCO2e per year will not be 
realized, agriculture can make a significant contribution to climate mitigation by 2030. Total annual 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions during the 1990s were approximately 20,000 MtCO2e per year, so 
agriculture could offset, at full biophysical potential, about 30% of total annual CO2 emissions, with 
offsets of approximately 8 percent, 13 percent, and 20 percent at prices of up to US$20, up to US$50, and 
up to US$100 per tCO2e. 
While agricultural emissions are highest in Asia and Latin America, the Middle East and North 
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest projected growth rate in agriculture-related emissions, at 
95 percent between 1990 and 2020, driven by the growing wealth of urban populations and consequent 
rising demand for livestock products, the intensification of agricultural production, and expansion into 
unexploited areas (Smith et al. 2007a; USEPA 2006a; Verchot 2007). Baseline estimates by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) show total GHG emissions from agriculture in Africa 
increasing until 2020 (see Table 7).  
Table 7. Baseline emissions from all agriculture (MtCO2e) 
Country/Region 2000  2010  2020 
Africa  301 364 431 
Annex I countries  1,258  1,230  1,297 
Brazil 249  292  327 
China 789  791  876 
India 417  441  480 
United States  338  351  370 
World total  4,563  4,417  4,822 
Source: USEPA 2006b 
Note: MtCO2e = mega tons of carbon dioxide or equivalent 
Table 7 shows that Africa is comparable to India and the United States in terms of the amount of 
GHG emissions from agriculture. Thus, there is great potential for climate-change mitigation from this 
sector. The USEPA (2006b) estimates potential emission savings at different carbon prices for selected 
regions and countries (Table 8). At carbon prices of US$60 per tCO2e, Africa can reduce emissions from 
its baseline estimate by 4.4 percent. While the total potential for emission reductions from agricultural 
production in Africa is less than that of the other countries and regions presented in Table 8, the potential 
savings from particular mitigation options such as cropland management in Africa are greater—14.2 
percent at US$60 per tCO2e, compared to 12.4 percent for Brazil, 12.5 percent for China, and 11.5 




Table 8. Total agriculture: Percentage reductions from baseline (see Table 7) at different prices 
(US$ per tCO2e) 
 2010  2020 
Country/Region  $0 $30 $60  $0 $30 $60 
Africa  1.6% 3.6% 4.5% 1.4% 3.5% 4.4% 
Annex  I  countries  11.1% 18.1% 20.0% 10.8% 16.2% 19.6% 
Brazil  3.2% 5.8% 7.2% 3.1% 5.6% 7.0% 
China  7.8% 14.1% 15.0%  6.3% 12.1% 12.9% 
India  1.6% 9.5% 9.7% 1.5% 9.3% 9.3% 
United  States  14.2% 22.9% 25.0% 13.8% 23.4% 24.9% 
World  total  7.1% 12.5% 14.3%  6.7% 11.6% 13.4% 
Source: USEPA 2006b 
Note: tCO2e = ton of carbon dioxide or equivalent 
A recent study assesses the technical and economic mitigation potential of various agricultural 
practices within different African regions (Smith et al. 2008). These results are presented in Table 9. As 
shown in the table, mitigation potential is largest in East, West, and Central Africa, with mitigation 
potentials of 109, 60, and 49 MtCO2e per year, respectively. The agricultural practices that appear 
promising include cropland management (69 MtCO2e per year), grazing land management (65 MtCO2e 
per year), and restoration of organic soils (61 MtCO2e per year). 
Table 9. Estimated economic mitigation potential by management practice and region 
   Economic Mitigation Potential by 2030 at Prices of up to US$20 per tCO2e 
(MtCO2e per year) 











East Africa   28  27  25  13  15  109 
Central Africa   13  12  11  6  7  49 
North Africa   6  6  6  3  3  25 
Southern Africa   6  5  5  3  3  22 
West Africa   16  15  14  7  8  60 
Total  69 (26%)  65 (25%)  61 (23%)  33 (12%)  37 (14%)  265 
Source: Smith et al. 2008 
Note: MtCO2e = mega tons of carbon dioxide or equivalent 
5.2. Land-Use Change and Forestry 
Two different approaches to estimating the mitigation potential of LULUCF are used in the literature: (1) 
regional, bottom-up assessments by country or continent or (2) global forest- or multisector models 
(Nabuurs et al. 2007). Even within similar types of studies, estimates vary due to differences in basic 
assumptions, mitigation options considered, and methodologies applied (ibid.). These issues, plus the 




uncertainty regarding the overall mitigation potential of the sector. With this note of caution, following 
are the results of several studies on the economic potential for mitigation in the forestry sector. 
Several regional studies examine the potential for savings from avoided deforestation in the 
tropics. According to Jung (2003), 93 percent of the mitigation potential in tropical regions over the short 
term is related to avoided deforestation. Over the long term (50 years), Sohngen and Sedjo (2006) 
estimate that deforestation could be eliminated at carbon prices of US$27.2 per tCO2 (a net gain of 
278,000 MtCO2) or reduced by 18,000 MtCO2 at a price of US$1.36 per tCO2. Other studies examine the 
potential of both avoided deforestation and afforestation. Sathaye et al. (2005) estimate that by 2050, the 
potential from both avoided deforestation and afforestation/reforestation is 13,570 MtCO2 at a price of 
US$5 per tCO2 + 5 percent annual carbon price increment, and 15,628 MtCO2 at a price of US$10 per 
tCO2 + 3 percent per year. Full results are reported in Table 10. 
Table 10. Carbon benefits gained across scenarios of carbon prices 
  Carbon Price  
(US$ per tCO2) 
Carbon Sequestered  
(MtCO2) 
2010 Carbon Price + Annual Increase  2050  2100  2050  2100 
US$5 + 5%  35  404  13,570  70,145 
Forestation     5,554  33,162 
Avoided deforestation      8,034  37,105 
US$10 + 3%  33  143  15,628  50,905 
Forestation     4,934  16,358 
Avoided deforestation      10,694  34,547 
US$20 + 3%  65  286  28,582  79,559 
Forestation     8,917  28,575 
Avoided deforestation      19,665  50,985 
US$100 + 0%  100  100  47,252  78,970 
Forestation     13,587  17,245 
Avoided deforestation      33,665  61,725 
Source: Sathaye et al. 2005 
Note: MtCO2 = mega tons of carbon dioxide  
Using a global model, Benitez-Ponce et al. (2007) project that annual sequestration from 
afforestation and reforestation would average 510 MtCO2 per year for the first 20 years and 805 MtCO2 
per year for the first 40 years at a price of US$13.6 per tCO2. Global models show that reduced 
deforestation in Central and South America has the greatest mitigation potential, followed by reduced 
deforestation in Africa, Asia, and the United States (see Table 11). Africa’s potential of 1,925 MtCO2e 
per year accounts for 14 percent of the global total. Even more important, Africa’s avoided-deforestation 




Table 11. Potential of mitigation measures of global forestry activities, global model results 
Region  Activity  Potential at Costs Equal or Less Than 
US$100 per tCO2, in MtCO2 per year in 
2030 
United States  Afforestation  445 
 Reduced  deforestation  10 
 Forest  management  1,590 
 Total  2,045 
Europe Afforestation  115 
 Reduced  deforestation  10 
 Forest  management  170 
 Total  295 
OECD Pacific  Afforestation  115 
 Reduced  deforestation  30 
 Forest  management  110 
 Total  255 
Non–Annex I East Asia  Afforestation  605 
 Reduced  deforestation  110 
 Forest  management  1,200 
 Total  1,915 
Countries in transition  Afforestation  545 
 Reduced  deforestation  85 
 Forest  management  1,055 
 Total  1,685 
Central and South America  Afforestation  750 
 Reduced  deforestation  1,845 
 Forest  management  550 
 Total  3,145 
Africa Afforestation  665 
 Reduced  deforestation  1,160 
 Forest  management  100 
 Total  1,925 
Other Asia  Afforestation  745 
 Reduced  deforestation  670 
 Forest  management  960 
 Total  2,375 
Middle East  Afforestation  60 
 Reduced  deforestation  30 
 Forest  management  45 
 Total  135 
TOTAL Afforestation  4,045 
 Reduced  deforestation  3,950 
 Forest  management  5,780 
  Total 13,775 
Source: Nabuurs et al. 2007 




As shown above, despite differences in estimates and methods, both regional and global studies 
show that there is great potential for climate-change mitigation through forestry activities, particularly in 
tropical areas. Thus, mitigation through the forestry sector should be a high priority in areas where 
deforestation is projected to continue. The options for mitigation in the agriculture and forestry sectors are 
discussed below.  
5.3. Mitigation Options in the Agriculture and Forestry Sectors 
Given the projected increases in GHG emissions related to LULUCF and agricultural production in 
Africa, these sectors have significant potential to contribute to climate-change mitigation. Several 
mitigation options are available in these two sectors. Mitigation options fall into three broad categories 
based on the mechanism for mitigation: reducing emissions into the atmosphere, enhancing removal of 
carbon from the atmosphere, or replacing fossil fuels with biofuels (Smith et al. 2007a). Specific options 
include (1) cropland management (enhancing yields, managing nutrients, reducing tillage, increasing 
water productivity, encouraging the conversion of cropland to another land cover), (2) grazing land 
management and pasture improvement (management of grazing intensity, increasing productivity, 
nutrient management, fire management, species introduction), (3) management of organic or peaty soils, 
(4) restoration of degraded lands, (5) livestock management (improving feeding practices, dietary 
additives, animal breeding), (6) manure management, and (7) bioenergy use (ibid.). Some of these 
mitigation practices affect more than one GHG, while some mainly affect one GHG. Practices that affect 
emissions at one site may be less effective in another. Thus, mitigation options should be chosen to suit 
individual agricultural systems (ibid.). 
Options for reducing emissions from the forest sector include (1) maintaining or increasing the 
forest area through avoided deforestation and through afforestation/reforestation; (2) maintaining or 
increasing the stand-level carbon density (tons of carbon per hectare) through the reduction of forest 
degradation and through planting, site preparation, tree improvement, fertilization, uneven-aged stand 
management, or other techniques; (3) maintaining or increasing the landscape-level carbon density using 
forest conservation, longer forest rotations, fire management, and protection against insects; and (4) 
increasing off-site carbon stocks in wood products, enhancing product and fuel substitution using forest-
derived biomass to substitute products with high fossil fuel requirements, and increasing the use of 
biomass-derived energy to substitute fossil fuels (Nabuurs et al. 2007). 
Among the mitigation options discussed above, certain options are better suited for the African 
region and have greater mitigation potential there. For instance, within agriculture, cropland management 
in Africa has great mitigation potential, while changes in rice production practices are less important in 
Africa than in Asia. With regard to LULUCF, the potential for mitigation from avoided deforestation in 
Africa is high (1,160 MtCO2 per year) compared to afforestation (665 MtCO2 per year) or forest 
management (100 MtCO2 per year), which have minimal potential to reduce emissions in Africa (Table 
11). 
Yet there are a number of constraints that prevent Africa from participating in carbon markets and 
implementing the above-mentioned projects, which would reduce GHG emissions. The following sections 




6.  CONSTRAINTS TO SSA PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL CARBON MARKETS 
6.1. Constraints to Participation in the CDM 
Although all 15 project categories listed in Table 3 are eligible for credit under the CDM, in its current 
form the CDM is mainly focusing on industrial-level energy and power sources. Afforestation and 
reforestation projects have also been emphasized for carbon credits under the CDM during the first 
commitment period (i.e., 2008–2012), while carbon sequestration from averted-deforestation projects and 
from agriculture, which are very important areas for climate mitigation in many African economies, have 
been systematically excluded or downplayed (UNFCCC 2001; Pearson, Walker, and Brown 2006). 
Consequently, Africa’s share of the CDM market is lower than its share of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) with respect to other developing countries over the past few years.  
While there is significant potential to mitigate GHG emissions by including activities in the 
agriculture and forestry sectors in carbon markets, the rules of the game under the CDM are biased 
against Africa and other poor developing countries. To be considered eligible to engage in carbon trading 
under the CDM, a project must meet several criteria. These include establishing a clear baseline and 
demonstrating that emission reductions would not have occurred in the absence of the project (the concept 
of additionality). Other rules and factors that constrain participation include leakages, the cost-
effectiveness of the projects, irreversibility, high transaction costs, property rights, and uncertainty (Smith 
and Scherr 2003). The following sections describe these constraints in greater detail. 
6.1.1. Exclusion of Soil Carbon Sequestration and Avoided Deforestation 
Soil carbon sequestration and avoided deforestation are important areas for climate-change mitigation. As 
shown above, the potential savings from these activities is high. Africa’s avoided-deforestation potential 
of 1,160 MtCO2e per year accounts for 29 percent of the global total (Nabuurs et al. 2007), and the 
potential for mitigation through agriculture in the African region is estimated at 970 MtCO2e per year 
until 2030, which is 17 percent of the global total (Smith et al. 2008).  
Figure 6. Share of greenhouse gas emissions by sector in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 




Furthermore, given that land-use change, forestry, and agriculture are the main sources of GHG 
emissions in the least-developed countries (see Figure 6), such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
inclusion of projects in these areas has the potential to promote pro-poor mitigation by encouraging the 
inclusion of poor countries in the CDM. Yet projects related to soil carbon sequestration and avoided 
deforestation remain excluded from the CDM, thereby preventing the participation of low-income 
countries and hindering mitigation efforts. 
6.1.2. Defining the Baseline 
The baseline scenario describes GHG emission activity in the absence of the project. Baseline estimates 
exclude emissions that would have to be removed to comply with national or local safety requirements or 
legal regulations. The three most common methods for establishing the baseline are benchmarking, 
technology matrix, and top-down baseline. With benchmarking, the host country establishes default 
emission rates for different sectors, subsectors, or regions, and any emission rate over and above the level 
that is likely to be achieved with the implementation of the project would be considered additional. Under 
the technology matrix, a number of predefined default technologies are identified as the baseline 
technologies for a defined region and for a specified time, and the emission baseline for a project would 
equal the emission rate for the specified technology. Consequently, any projects that introduced 
technologies with GHG emissions lower than the specified baseline technology would be considered as 
providing additional reductions. Finally, the top-down baseline is determined by a host government. It 
allows a country to assess project additionality in the context of its overall planning effort to mitigate 
climate change.  
The two most important requirements for designing an adequate baseline are technical know-how 
and availability of data. It has been noted that in most cases historical data are readily available but reflect 
dirtier technologies, indicating that enormous “unfair” gains could be made if the project leads to a drastic 
shift toward much cleaner technology. It has therefore been recommended that if historical data are used, 
some higher standards such as new additions within the last 10 years or top-25-percent performers could 
be used (Kelly 1999). Alternatively, if projected data exist, they could be used to create tougher 
benchmarks, under the assumption that the host countries will not take advantage of the uncertainties 
associated with forecast data. For many countries in SSA, a lack of technical training and support in 
setting benchmarks as well as poor data availability and quality are obstacles to defining an adequate 
baseline (ibid.).  
6.1.3. The Additionality Criterion 
A project is said to meet the additionality criterion if the carbon sequestration or emission reductions 
achieved by the project would not have been achieved in the absence of incentives provided by the CDM 
(i.e., baseline). The carbon credits earned reflect the difference in emissions with and without the project 
activities.  
To demonstrate additionality, the following steps must be followed
26: 
1.  Alternatives to the project activity should be identified. 
2.  An investment analysis must be performed to show that the proposed project activity is not the 
most financially attractive or beneficial. 
3.  Barriers that could prevent the implementation of the proposed project but do not prevent the 
implementation of at least one of the alternatives should be presented. 
4.  A common-practice analysis that examines the extent to which the project type has already been 
diffused in the relevant sector or region should be performed. 
5.  How registration of the project as a CDM activity enables the project to be undertaken should be 
explained. 
                                                      




Additionality is advocated because if a CDM project—say, reforestation—would have been 
undertaken either through deliberate management action or natural processes, then allowing the CDM 
transaction to take place would permit the Annex I country to emit more GHGs. The net level of 
emissions would therefore be higher than if the transaction had not taken place (Pearson, Walker, and 
Brown 2006).  
By definition, afforestation or reforestation projects comprise human-induced conversion of 
nonforest land uses to forest, through planting, seeding, and/or human-induced promotion of natural seed 
sources. Afforestation differs from reforestation only in that afforestation takes place on land that has not 
been forested for at least 50 years, while reforestation refers to land that did not contain forest on 
December 31,
 1989 (Smith and Scherr 2003; Pearson, Walker, and Brown 2006). In practice, however, no 
distinction is made under the CDM between afforestation and reforestation. Land that is eligible for 
afforestation or reforestation under the CDM should have been (a) nonforest on December 31, 1989, and 
(b) nonforest at the initiation of project activity. This requirement seeks to prevent landowners from 
cutting down their forest in order to meet the eligibility criteria for carbon credit under the CDM 
(Pearson, Walker, and Brown 2006). The definition of a forest under the CDM allows some flexibility. 
The designated national authorities, which are national presiding authorities in non–Annex I countries, 
have the responsibility to decide on the limit within the following thresholds:  
1.  Minimum tree crown cover value between 10 and 30 percent  
2.  Minimum land area value between 0.05 and 1 hectare 
3.  Minimum tree height value between 2 and 5 meters 
Additionality can be difficult to demonstrate for agriculture and forestry projects, since many 
mitigation possibilities are financially viable and are already occurring. It is therefore difficult to 
determine how much of an activity can be attributed to the CDM (Smith et al. 2007b). Moreover, for 
forest projects, the definition of a high crown cover may exclude agroforestry projects or low-stature 
trees, whereas a “low” definition may exclude degraded areas with sparse tree cover in the baseline. A 
high value for minimum land area encourages areas with real environmental and biodiversity benefits but 
excludes typical community forests and agroforests around dwellings.  
The UN climate conference in Bali in 2007 agreed to include forest conservation in future 
discussions on a new global warming treaty. Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD) was considered a potentially cost-effective way to address environmental degradation by 
assigning value to intact ecosystems such as rainforests and peat swamps. The UK government’s 2005 
Stern Review also acknowledged forest protection as one of the most cost-effective ways to address 
climate change. Given the high rate of deforestation in Africa, this is welcome news for CDM projects 
related to afforestation, reforestation, and averted deforestation. However, rather than paying for projects 
directly, REDD is designed to operate with rewards accruing nationally or subnationally (Luttrell, 
Schreckenberg, and Peskett 2007). 
6.1.4. Other Constraints to Carbon Market Participation 
In addition to the problems due to project exclusions and the baseline and additionality requirements, 
Africa’s participation in the CDM is also constrained by a number of other factors, as discussed below. 
  Leakages 
The adoption of certain agricultural practices or forest conservation or reforestation efforts may 
reduce emissions in a given area or region. However, emission savings could be offset if agricultural 
production shifts to other regions where little effort is expended on mitigation measures in agriculture or 
forest conservation efforts (Smith et al. 2007b). Community-based agriculture and forestry projects will 
result in leakages if the project takes over community land and does not adequately compensate the 
community. For example, projects that displace significant annual crop production need to simultaneously 
increase the productivity of agricultural land through labor-intensive technologies. Thus, livelihood-




leakage. In practice, however, considerable difficulties may occur in fulfilling community needs in 
developing countries.  
  Cost-effectiveness 
Production cost is defined as the cost of establishing and maintaining the new carbon-
sequestering land use for the duration of the project, divided by the total carbon benefits accumulated by 
the project during its existence. For afforestation and reforestation projects, production costs include tree 
establishment, tree management and processing, and the opportunity cost of land. In the case of averted-
deforestation projects, these costs include compensatory payments to the sources of deforestation threats, 
as well as the cost of measures to prevent future deforestation (such as the costs of patrolling the area and 
establishing sustainable community forestry or ecotourism within the project area). Although the level of 
carbon benefits used for calculating production costs should be adjusted for additionality and leakage, 
very few estimates do so. Therefore, most figures should be taken as underestimates of the cost of 
supplying carbon services. Studies have shown that the production costs for afforestation and 
reforestation projects such as agroforestry systems and community plantations are often higher than the 
costs of industrial plantations. Assisted natural regeneration, in contrast, tends to be much less expensive 
than tree planting because typically it includes low-cost techniques such as the restriction of grazing and 
the management of coppices and shoots. Moreover, the price of carbon in a full-fledged market is still 
highly uncertain, making it difficult to determine the cost-effectiveness of CDM projects.  
  Irreversibility  
When deciding on the number of CDM projects to be implemented, it is imperative that 
developing countries be aware that they may be facing their own emission-reduction commitments in the 
future. Since most emission-abatement measures are irreversible, ignoring possible future commitments 
could lead to some problems. Notably, the cheapest abatement measures will be implemented for CDM 
projects, leaving the developing countries with only more expensive measures when they have to meet 
their own commitments in the future. 
  High transaction costs 
The costs of carbon projects include the cost of providing information about carbon benefits to 
potential buyers, communicating with project partners, and ensuring that all parties fulfill their contractual 
obligations. Measurement and monitoring costs are also considerable. These transaction costs per unit of 
emission reduction seem likely to be much higher for projects involving local communities, as the costs 
of negotiating land-use decisions with large numbers of geographically dispersed local people with 
different land-use objectives in SSA will tend to be higher for a community-managed project than for 
most strict forest protection or industrial plantation projects. Some experts have therefore recommended 
that smaller-sized community projects be pooled to lower project development, marketing, certification, 
and insurance costs (Noble 2003; Smith and Scherr 2003). 
Moreover, livelihood-enhancing projects such as agroforestry, community plantations, forest 
gardens, and secondary forest fallows often face significant institutional barriers such as difficulties in 
financing establishment costs and obtaining planting materials, and a lack of technical assistance or 
marketing infrastructure.  
  Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about gas emissions and carbon storage processes and measurement make investors 
more wary of these options and more likely to choose clearly defined industrial mitigation activities 
(Smith et al. 2007b). Thus, a greater effort must be made to demonstrate the significant savings available 
through agriculture and forestry projects. 
  Property rights 
Currently, one-half to two-thirds of the forests in developing countries are state owned, with 




forests where local communities have customary-use rights. As a result, in the absence of supportive 
legislation, revenues may be captured only by those who have formal land titles, while communities with 
customary rights are excluded (White and Martin 2002).  
  Lack of development 
In its current form, the CDM is mainly focused on industrial-level energy and power sources. 
However, in Africa, energy or electricity access is limited. This reduces the mitigation opportunities 
through clean development of electricity projects.  
6.2. Constraints to Participation in Other Carbon Markets 
Other carbon markets have excluded major carbon assets such as LULUCF and agroforestry credits in 
their carbon transactions, making it difficult for many non–Annex I parties, including SSA countries, to 
participate in the emission trading system (Painuly 2001; Smith and Scherr 2003; Capoor and Ambrosi 
2006). This has limited the potential benefits obtainable from the other large markets such as the EU ETS. 
Also, developing countries are not included in any numerical limitation of the Kyoto Protocol because 
they were not the main contributors to GHG emissions during the pretreaty industrialization period 
(Persson, Azar, and Lindgren 2006). Indeed, many African countries have thin energy and industrial 
sectors with limited opportunities to reduce carbon emissions (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006). However, 
even without the commitment to reduce emissions according to the Kyoto target, developing countries do 




7.  OPTIONS FOR INTEGRATING SSA INTO GLOBAL CARBON MARKETS 
There are several options for making carbon markets more inclusive of SSA countries. Many of these 
options would also enable the poor within these countries to benefit from carbon trading by reducing the 
transaction costs associated with small-scale carbon offset projects. Expanding carbon markets within 
SSA would also increase the profitability of environmentally sustainable activities. For these reasons, 
there should be more political discussion and negotiation on the ways in which carbon markets should be 
expanded and how they can promote poverty reduction and environmental sustainability. Following are 
several options that should be explored further. 
1.  Simplify the rules of the game under the CDM 
Rules for accessing carbon markets should be simplified. The successful inclusion of avoided-
deforestation and soil carbon sequestration projects in the CCX demonstrates that these activities could be 
included in the CDM by simplifying rules for issuing credits and using modern monitoring techniques 
while simultaneously reducing transaction costs (Rosegrant 2007). According to the Marrakesh Accords, 
small-scale projects, such as agroforestry and community forestry projects, whose annual emission offsets 
are less than 15,000 tCO2, can benefit from simplified ways of determining baselines, monitoring carbon 
emissions, and enforcing offsets. Simplified emission-reduction credits could be calculated using 
standardized reference emission rates for different emission-reduction or storage activities in specific 
locations, as determined and verified by independent bodies; an uncertainty discount could be applied. 
These changes could significantly reduce the transaction costs of community-based projects and expand 
participation in carbon markets—not only of SSA countries but of poor rural communities (ibid.).  
CCX rules regarding soil carbon and forestry projects are simplified yet remain rigorous, 
requiring annual verification by a third party. Currently, under the CCX, eligible agricultural soil carbon 
sequestration projects include grass planting and continuous conservation tillage. To qualify for 
agricultural soil carbon offsets, the project must include a minimum five-year commitment to a tillage 
practice that leaves two-thirds of the soil surface undisturbed and two-thirds of the crop residue on the 
surface. The project must also conserve between 0.2 and 0.6 MtCO2 per acre per year, enroll through a 
registered offset aggregator (administrative entity representative of the offset project owners), and be 
independently verified (see http://www.chicagoclimatex.com). Eligible projects in the forestry sector 
include afforestation, forest management, urban tree planting, and forest conservation projects. Contracts 
are issued to forest enrichment projects on unforested or degraded forest land (including urban tree 
planting) at a rate based on the annual increase in the carbon stocks of above-ground, living biomass. In a 
key breakthrough, forest conservation credits for combined conservation and forestation projects on 
contiguous sites are credited on the basis of the avoided-deforestation rates specified for eligible 
geographic regions. Quantification methods for forest carbon stocks vary by project size to reduce 
transaction costs for smaller projects. Carbon in small to medium afforestation projects (under 12,500 
MtCO2) is assessed through CCX carbon accumulation tables or direct methods (direct in-field sampling 
and measurement). In large projects, carbon accumulation is measured directly or determined by properly 
parameterized growth models.  
2.  Broaden the CDM definition of afforestation and reforestation 
Many projects currently not included in the CDM definition of afforestation and reforestation 
offer great mitigation potential and would present an opportunity for greater SSA participation. The 
definition of afforestation and reforestation should be expanded to include agroforestry, assisted natural 
regeneration, forest rehabilitation, forest gardens, and improved forest fallow projects, all of which offer a 
low-cost approach to carbon sequestration while presenting fewer social risks and significant community 
and biodiversity benefits (Smith and Scherr 2003; Rosegrant 2007). Short-duration tree-growing activities 
should also be permitted, with suitable discounting (Rosegrant 2007). Limiting project types introduces 




3.  Allow soil carbon sequestration and avoided-deforestation projects under the CDM 
Given that the largest share of emissions in SSA countries comes from deforestation and 
agricultural practices, including projects that prevent deforestation and reduce soil carbon emissions from 
agriculture under the CDM would not only increase SSA’s participation in global carbon markets but 
would also increase mitigation. Given the clear trends of tropical deforestation in the developing world 
and the widespread degradation of forests due to unsustainable logging, it would be possible to 
demonstrate additionality for either strict forest protection projects or multiple-use forest management. 
Similarly, the baseline trends and mitigation potentials of various agricultural practices have already been 
established (see Smith et al. 2008), facilitating the inclusion of carbon offset projects in the agriculture 
sector. 
4.  Establish international capacity-building and advisory services 
The successful promotion of livelihood-enhancing CDM forestry and agriculture projects requires 
an investment in capacity-building and advisory services for potential investors, project designers and 
managers, national policymakers, and leaders of local organizations and federations (Rosegrant 2007). 
Regional centers could be established to assist countries and communities involved in forest carbon 
trading, while companies or agencies could provide specialized business services for low-income 
producers to help them negotiate deals or design monitoring systems (ibid.). Further investment in 
advanced measurement and monitoring could also dramatically reduce transaction costs. Measurement 
and monitoring techniques have been improving rapidly, thanks to a growing body of field measurements 
and the use of statistics and computer modeling, remote sensing, global positional systems, and 
geographic information systems, allowing changes in stocks of carbon to be estimated more accurately at 
a lower cost (ibid.). 
5.  Award credits under the CDM to countries with clean development 
While the CDM is mainly focused on industrial-level energy and power sources, in Africa, energy 
or electricity access is a major challenge. Thus, mitigation opportunities through clean development are 
limited. In most SSA countries, less than 10 percent of the population has access to the electricity grid. 
Yet under CDM rules, a clean, grid-connected electricity project in one of these countries must 
demonstrate that it displaces “carbon-intensive” electricity on its grid. Even when these countries have 
access to electricity, the fact that they derive power mainly from clean hydro sources is seen as a reason 
for them not to receive credits for clean energy sources, given the baseline and additionality requirements. 
This unnecessarily punishes the poorest of the poor countries, which can least afford to use dirty but 
expensive electricity sources. Methodologies must be developed through which countries generating clean 
energy sources with low emissions are rewarded. 
6.  Increase participation in voluntary markets 
Given the limitations of the CDM, African countries should aim to participate more in the 
emerging and fast-growing voluntary carbon markets, including the CCX and non-compliance-based 
voluntary markets. Voluntary markets have expanded rapidly over the past several years and are expected 
to continue to expand exponentially in the coming years with growing popular interest in mitigating 
climate change. Given their rapid expansion and the inclusion of a broader range of offset projects, 
including projects involving avoided deforestation and soil carbon sequestration, these markets present an 
opportunity for countries that have had limited access to the current compliance-driven global carbon 
market. In order to increase participation in these markets, African countries should raise awareness 
among both public and private stakeholders and develop institutional capacity and technical expertise for 
viable project development and implementation. Alternative sources of demand for carbon credits, such 
as voluntary markets, may have the flexibility to reward these efforts, regardless of the future 




7.  Carbon exchanges should involve local representative organizations 
Given the difficulty of maintaining contact with numerous local people, often in geographically 
dispersed areas, it is necessary to engage locally accountable intermediary organizations that are able to 
manage projects and mediate between investors and local people (Boyd, Gutierrez, and Chang 2007; 
Rosegrant 2007). Offset aggregators in the CCX are an example of an intermediary that brings together 
multiple offset-generating projects. Local stakeholder engagement ensures that project designs will be 
flexible, context-specific, socially acceptable, and sustainable (Boyd, Gutierrez, and Chang 2007). It also 
ensures that projects will be designed in a way that is not threatening to local livelihoods and does not 
result in leakage—shifting the carbon-producing activity to a new location. In contrast, top-down projects 
that do not involve local stakeholders while compromising their access to resources stand to fail and miss 
the opportunity to make carbon offset projects pro-poor (ibid.). Working with existing community-based 
organizations where links to local people have already been established offers clear benefits. In particular, 
communities with positive past experiences with development projects have much lower transaction 
costs. A carbon project in Chiapas, Mexico, estimated that the sociotechnical costs of capacity building 
varied from US$52 per hectare in communities with experience with community-managed projects to 
US$325 per hectare in communities with a high degree of communal divisions and social conflicts (de 
Jong, Tipper, and Montoya-Gómez 2000). 
8.  Strengthen property rights 
Carbon markets created by global and national institutions may involve changing property rights 
regimes or overturning the traditional management of property rights (Brown and Corbera 2003). 
Currently, benefits may be captured by large landholders with clear property rights while communities 
with customary rights are excluded or inadequately compensated (Smith and Scherr 2003; White and 
Martin 2002). It is important that governments in SSA countries initiate processes to clarify forest rights 
and reject CDM projects where rights are unclear and overlapping, unless communities with customary 
rights participate in the decision-making process and benefits (Smith and Scherr 2003). Strengthening the 
property rights of local communities would ensure that these communities participate in defining and 
implementing carbon offset projects, and receiving the benefits created.  
9.  Implement social assessments of projects 
Given the sustainable-development objectives of the CDM, greater international and national 
regulation of carbon offset projects is needed to ensure that social and environmental goals are met (Smith 
and Scherr 2003). Social impact assessments should be conducted to determine the extent to which 
standards are followed and communities benefit from carbon projects. Improving the regulation of carbon 




8.  CONCLUSIONS 
The growth of Africa’s agriculture places new demands on its environment and natural resources such as 
forestlands (which are declining at alarming rates) and croplands. Given that Africa’s economic 
development will increase its energy demand in the near future, carbon trading could be a win-win-win 
situation for Africa in terms of conserving its natural resources, contributing to the good of the global 
environment, and generating income to finance its development activities.  
The potential for Africa to contribute to GHG mitigation is large. Estimates show that at prices of 
US$60 per tCO2e, Africa can reduce emissions from its baseline estimate by 4.4 percent by 2020 through 
changes in the agricultural sector. Africa also has great potential to contribute to GHG reductions through 
the forestry sector, with estimates showing a savings potential of 1,925 MtCO2 per year (at a price of 
US$100 per tCO2) by 2030. Particularly large are the potential savings from cropland management in 
Africa, at 14.2 percent (at a price of US$60 per tCO2e) by 2020. The potential savings from avoided 
deforestation is 1,160 MtCO2 per year (at a price of US$100 per tCO2) by 2030. 
For this potential to be realized, numerous barriers must be overcome. The gap between technical 
potential and realized GHG mitigation is a result of the barriers described in this paper, including the rules 
and factors surrounding current carbon markets, as well as the institutional (property rights), capacity, and 
economic constraints. The volume and type of agricultural mitigation options ultimately adopted will also 
depend upon the price of CO2 equivalents.  
For the SSA region, the mitigation mechanisms that show the greatest promise are either 
excluded from the CDM or other major trading schemes (in the case of avoided deforestation) or 
downplayed (in the case of agriculture and afforestation or reforestation) given various policy and 
technical constraints to implementation such as demonstrating additionality, establishing a baseline, 
preventing leakage, and high transaction costs.  
But not all is gloomy. A number of CDM projects have been earmarked for SSA. These projects 
will sequester GHGs and also direct financial benefits to members of the local communities from the 
payment for environmental services and trade in nontimber forest products. The World Bank has 
mobilized a fund for demonstration projects that sequester or conserve carbon in forest and agro-
ecosystems in developing countries, with a first tranche of US$53.8 million.  
In view of this, SSA needs to strengthen its capacity and engage both private and public sectors in 
project development and implementation in order to take advantage of the flourishing carbon market. 
Simplifying the rules of the CDM regarding participation, measurement, and enforcement of offset 
projects; establishing international capacity-building and advisory services; awarding emission 
allowances and credits to developing countries; and increasing participation in voluntary markets would 
further integrate SSA countries into global carbon markets.  
Policymakers should ensure that the benefits of carbon market participation are distributed 
equitably within countries and that the needs of the poor are taken into consideration. Working with 
intermediary organizations that are accountable to local producers, building community management 
capacity, strengthening property rights, and improving the regulation of offset projects to ensure social 
and environmental sustainability would ensure that the poor benefit from the carbon trading system while 
generating both income gains and environmental security. Achieving this result will require effective 
integration throughout the process, from the global governance of carbon trading to the sectoral and 





A.1. Basic Principles of the Kyoto Protocol 
  Kyoto is underwritten by governments and is governed by global legislation enacted under 
the UN’s aegis. 
  Governments are separated into two general categories: developed countries, referred to as 
Annex I countries (which have accepted greenhouse gas [GHG] emission-reduction 
obligations and must submit an annual GHG inventory), and developing countries, referred to 
as non–Annex I countries (which have no GHG emission-reduction obligations but may 
participate in the Clean Development Mechanism [CDM]). 
  Any Annex I country that fails to meet its Kyoto obligation will be penalized by having to 
submit 1.3 emission allowances in a second commitment period for every ton of GHG 
emissions by which the country exceeded its cap in the first commitment period (i.e., 2008–
2012). 
  By 2008–2012, Annex I countries must reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 5 
percent below their 1990 levels (for many countries, such as the EU member states, this 
corresponds to some 15 percent below their expected GHG emissions in 2008). While the 
average emission reduction is 5 percent, national limitations range from 8 percent reductions 
for the European Union to a 10 percent emission increase for Iceland; but since the European 
Union intends to meet its target by distributing different rates among its member states, much 
larger increases (up to 27 percent) are allowed for some of the less-developed EU countries. 
Reduction limitations expire in 2013. 
  Kyoto includes “flexible mechanisms” that allow Annex I economies to meet their GHG 
emission limitations by purchasing GHG emission reductions from elsewhere. These can be 
bought either from financial exchanges (such as the new unrelated-to-Kyoto EU Emission 
Trading Scheme [ETS]) or from projects that reduce emissions in non–Annex I economies 
under the CDM, or in other Annex I countries under the Joint Implementation (JI) scheme. 
  Only CDM executive board–accredited Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) can be bought 
and sold in this manner. Under the aegis of the UN, Kyoto established this Bonn-based CDM 
executive board to assess and approve CDM projects in non–Annex I economies prior to 
awarding CERs. A similar scheme, called JI, applies in transitional economies (mainly 
covering the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe). 
  The cost of complying with Kyoto is prohibitive for many Annex I countries, especially those 
countries such as Japan and the Netherlands with highly efficient, low-GHG-polluting 
industries and high prevailing environmental standards. Kyoto therefore allows these 
countries to purchase carbon credits instead of reducing GHG emissions domestically. This is 
seen as a means of encouraging non–Annex I developing economies to reduce GHG 
emissions, as doing so is now economically viable due to the sale of carbon credits. 
A.2. Clean Development Mechanism 
The CDM arose out of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997. The U.S. government wished for as much 
flexibility as possible in achieving emission reductions and desired the possibility of international 
emissions trading to achieve cost-effective emission reductions. Eventually, the CDM and two other 
flexible mechanisms were written into the Kyoto Protocol. 
Thus, the CDM  is an arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol allowing industrialized countries 




developing countries as an alternative to what are generally considered more costly emission reductions in 
their own countries. 
An industrialized country that wishes to receive credits from a CDM project must obtain the 
confirmation of the developing country hosting the project that it will contribute to sustainable 
development. Then, using methodologies approved by the CDM executive board, the applicant (the 
industrialized country in this case) must make the case that the project would not have been implemented 
anyway (establishing additionality) and must establish a baseline estimating the future emissions in the 
absence of the registered project. The case is then validated by a third-party agency, a so-called 
designated operational entity (DOE), to ensure that the project results in real, measurable, and long-term 
emission reductions. The executive board then decides whether or not to register (approve) the project. If 
a project is registered and implemented, the executive board issues credits, so-called CERs,
27 to project 
participants based on the monitored difference between the baseline and actual emissions, as verified by 
an external DOE. 
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